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Nontechnical Summary
For most types of crimes but especially for violent ones, the number of o¤enses
per inhabitant is larger in the US than in Europe. In the same time, expenditures for
police, courts and prisons are also higher in the US than in Europe. Thus, surprisingly,
the American law enforcement system seems to produce less security by spending
more.
In the present paper we show that this apparent contradiction can be explained by
di¤erent attitudes towards the welfare state. Our argument is based on the economic
theory of criminality which describes illegal behavior as the result of a rational choice.
Among other things, this choice depends on how much one has to lose in case of a
conviction. Consequently, by raising the living standards of the poor through welfare
payments, the government can reduce the crime rate.
Taking this e¤ect into account, we derive the optimal combination of law en-
forcement expenditures and welfare benets. We distinguish between two di¤erent
motivations for paying transfers. First, we assume that the welfare state has no other
purpose but ghting criminality. In this situation, one nds that a higher demand
for safety leads to higher welfare payments and higher law enforcement expenditures.
According to the evidence, however, higher law enforcement e¤orts go in hand with
a lower level of security.
As a second motivation for the welfare state, we consider altruism. In this situa-
tion, a minimum income level for poor persons is xed exclusively by justice or equity
considerations. Although motivated di¤erently, however, transfers reduce criminality
as a side e¤ect. Thus, the more generous attitude towards welfare recipients in Europe
can explain why crime rates are lower there than in the US. Moreover, the increase
in welfare payments a¤ects the optimal choice of law enforcement expenditures. We
show that these expenditures are reduced if one increases social transfers for altruistic
reasons. Thus, in accordance with the evidence, our model predicts lower crime rates
together with lower law enforcement expenditures as the welfare state expands.
We conclude that the evidence on the transatlantic di¤erences in crime rates
and enforcement e¤orts is not consistent with a view of the welfare state as a mere
instrument to ght criminality. In contrast, if transfers are motivated by altruism,
they inuence law enforcement activities and the level of security in a way which
corresponds to empirical observations.
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Abstract
We use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded
on a security argument, there is a negative trade-o¤ between law enforcement
expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism,
the correlation between the same variables may appear positive. We argue that
it provides a plausible explanation for the startling di¤erence between the US
and Europe in crime statistics and law enforcement expenditures [JEL: K0,
H3].
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1. Introduction
Comparing crime statistics and law enforcement expenditures between the United
States of America and the member states of the European Union, we nd two peculiar
observations. On the one hand, law enforcement outlay in the US is much higher than
in Europe.1 Yet despite this, reported crime rates are generally higher in the US. For
some crime categories the di¤erence is minor. In other cases it is very signicant
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1We interpret law enforcement expenditures as including police, court and prison costs. Though
the US does employ on average more police than European counterparts, it is in particular for
prison costs that the di¤erences are staggering. Specically, according to the United Nation Survey
of Crime Trends, in 1990 the US incarceration rate (465 persons for 100,000 inhabitants) was more
than 7 time as high as for the average of Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands (60
persons for 100,000 inhabitants).
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with US rates as much as 2 to 3 times higher than its European counterpart.2 Given
that these countries are all highly developed with similar political and economic
institutions, and have a comparable historical and cultural heritage, the distinct
behavior is startling, to say the least.
>From the point of view of an economist, the dissimilarities are also puzzling. To
see why, suppose we interpret the provision of public safety as a production process
where law enforcement enters as one input. Since relative prices do not appear widely
di¤erent across both continents and since there are no reasons to believe that inputs
in safety are inferior, one would expect that more law enforcement would go hand
in hand with a higher level of security. Yet, despite a much higher spending for its
police and justice system, the US appears to exhibit more criminality.
There have been numerous attempts to explain these facts. Arguments range from
the analysis of the formal justice system and police procedures to less formal institu-
tions like family, schools and community, the availability of rearms, the percentage of
young male in the population, measurement and reporting errors, etc. Notwithstand-
ing the relevance of any of these arguments, we suggest yet another answer based on
the di¤erent willingness of governments to intervene with redistributive taxation.
Specically, we introduce a stylized model with just two types of agents distin-
guished by their productivity. This results in a two class society with rich and poor
individuals. We introduce an incomemaintenance policy towards the disfavored which
is theoretically justied by one of two standard arguments found in the existing liter-
ature. Either redistributive taxation is determined to maximize the welfare function
of an altruistic social planner3 or it is legitimized on the grounds that it contributes
to a reduction in criminality.4
We examine two scenarios. First, we formalize the foregoing production theoretic
argument. In that case, redistribution is based on security considerations alone. Law
enforcement and transfers are two instruments solely devoted to the production of
public safety. We provide simple conditions for both inputs to be normal so that an
increase in safety requires a raise in either policy variable. In the alternative setup,
redistribution is determined by the social planner on the reason of altruism. For that
case, we show that raising transfers for the disfavored crowds out law enforcement
expenditures, yet boosts security. We argue that this trade-o¤ provides a rationale for
the di¤erent transatlantic pattern of transfers to the poor, as well as, law enforcement
policies and crime rates.
>From amodelling perspective, our paper is closely related to three recent articles.
2For example according to the Interpol International Crime Statistics 1996, the US had with 202
per 100,000 inhabitants more than twice as many roberries and violent thefts than the average for
Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
3See, e.g. Mirrlees (1971) or Sheshinski (1972).
4See, for example Pauly (1973: 38) if poverty contributes to the incidence of crimes against
property and persons, one way to reduce crime may be to redistribute income. For an earlier
similar view, see Hayek (1960). There is also empirical support for the argument. For instance,
Entorf and Spengler (1998) nd that higher income inequality leads to higher crime rates.
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Benoit and Osborne (1995), Imrohoglu, Merlo and Rupert (1998), and Demougin and
Schwager (1998) also use a general equilibrium model where the government taxes
individuals to nance crime reducing policies. In this note, we focus exclusively on an
issue not addressed by these articles. More generally, our analysis is part of a broad
literature initiated by Beckers (1968) seminal work on the economics of crime.
The remaining of the note is organized as follows. The next section presents a
microeconomic model. Sections 3 and 4 examine the cases of a security based and
an altruistically motivated transfer policy. The last section o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2. The Model
We stylize society by a model with a public sector and two types of agents dis-
tinguished by their respective ability to generate legal earnings. High productivity
individuals make a gross income denoted by a, they pay a tax t and are subject to
random criminality. Their preferences are represented by the function
v
a
(t; n) = a¡ b(t)¡ c(n); (1)
where b(t) and c(n) represent the utility loss caused by taxation and by criminality,
respectively. The expression b(t) includes the actual tax payment, as well as the
ensuing excess burden of taxation. We assume b0; b00 > 0 which means that from the
point of view of individuals, taxes are costly at an increasing rate.
In analogy to the cost of taxation, we interpret c(n) as incorporating both the
expected loss of wealth and the excess burden caused by criminality. That excess
burden can be explained either on the grounds of risk aversion considerations or by
the possibility of physical harm (for a discussion of this interpretation, see Demougin
and Schwager (1998)). The function c(n) satises c0 > 0 and c00 > 0, the intuition
being that additional criminality is harmful and that marginal damage should not be
decreasing.
For parsimony, we assume that the low productivity agents do not generate any
legal earnings5 and are never the victim of a crime.6 Through a welfare system,
these agents may receive a lump sum transfer ¿ > 0. Altogether, the utility of low
productivity individuals reduces to:
v0(¿) = ¿ : (2)
Alternatively, agents may engage in criminal activities. As has been done in pre-
vious work (see Brennan (1973), Imrohoglu, Merlo and Rupert (1998), and Demougin
5A natural interpretation of this assumption is that the productivity of these individuals is below
a minimum wage. We note that, introducing a small positive income for poor individuals would not
alter either the analysis nor its intuition, provided the poor remain net welfare recipients.
6It is well known that poor persons also su¤er from criminality. To include a damage function
analogous to c(n) in the utility of unproductive individuals would not alter our main conclusions,
but unnecessarily clutter the analysis.
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and Schwager (1998)), we could model the occupational decision process explicitly.
Instead, we refer to the existing literature and focus on the aggregate solution.
Following standard reasoning in the economic theory of criminality, incentives to
commit a crime are taken to depend on the probability as well as on the opportunity
cost of being convicted. In the current analysis, we restrict attention to two public
inputs a¤ecting occupational choice, transfers ¿ and law enforcement activities sum-
marized by the variable ½ (for brevity, we sometime refer to the second public activity
as police but, of course, it is thought to aggregate many other policy variables like
court, prison etc.). Naturally, more police is presumed to increase the arrest proba-
bility, whereas transfers are assumed to raise the opportunity cost of a conviction.
We denote with n(½; ¿) the resulting number of crimes. From the above argument,
n(½; ¿) is decreasing in both policy instruments.7 We further assume that n is convex
in both inputs with n½¿ = 0. The constraints on direct second order derivatives
are natural restrictions reecting diminishing marginal productivity of police and
transfers. The requirement n½¿ = 0 states that the marginal crime reducing impact
of one instrument is independent of the level of the other.8 This assumption is done
mainly to simplify the presentation. What is really needed is that the cross derivatives
are small enough, such that, in the comparative static analysis direct e¤ects remain
dominant.
In order to nance these policies, the state collects taxes. In order to write the
budget constraint, we express with e(½; ¿ ) the public outlays in per capita of the
productive population. Thus, government policies are restricted by the condition
t = e(½; ¿ ): (3)
The function e is assumed increasing and convex in both variables reecting increasing
marginal costs. Furthermore, since police and social transfers are two separate items
in the government budget, we impose the natural requirement e½¿ = 0.
3. Transfers based on security
In this section, we formalize the heuristic discussed in the introduction. For this
purpose, we assume that the government expenditure is determined by taxpayers,
for the sole purpose of nancing their security. Accordingly, if transfers occur, their
only justication results from their crime reducing impact. Analytically, we solve the
following problem:
max
½;¿
va = a¡ b(e(½; ¿))¡ c(n(½; ¿ )) (I)
subject to v0 = ¿ > 0 : (4)
7We follow standard notation with n½ =
@n
@½
, etc.
8The above requirement n½¿ = 0 is a slight abuse of notation. Since n¿ < 0; we know that the
graph of n as a function of ½ is shifted downwards as ¿ increases. What we assume is that this shift
is parallel. Obviously, at the lower bound where n = 0; such a parallel shift is no longer possible.
For the analysis, this is of no consequence since optimal n is never equal to zero.
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In this optimization problem, the public policy is only restricted by the impossibility
to tax the unproductive part of the population. The ensuing rst-order conditions
for the solution (½¤; ¿ ¤) are
¡b0e½ ¡ c
0n½ = 0 ; (5)
¡b0e¿ ¡ c
0n¿ + ¹ = 0 ; (6)
¹¿¤ = 0 ; (7)
where ¹ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier from the wealth constraint of the poor.
Two scenarios can arise. Either the wealth constraint for the disfavored is binding
 in which case ¹ > 0; no transfers are paid and ½ implicitly follows from (5)  or ¹ = 0
and transfers are positive. In that later case, the multiplicator can be eliminated and
the rst-order conditions imply
e½
e¿
=
n½
n¿
: (8)
In the equality, the left hand side is the marginal rate of transformation between
transfers and police in the government budget. It measures by how much transfers can
increase if police is reduced by one unit, while keeping total public spending constant.
The right hand side gives the marginal rate of substitution between transfers and law
enforcement outlay along an isocriminality curve dened by n = n(½; ¿). It states by
how much transfers have to vary, if one wants to keep criminality unchanged after
reducing police by one unit. In an interior solution, these two marginal rates must
obviously be equal.
The equality (8) also denes the expansion path ½¤(¿) which characterizes the
optimal policy mix for any desired level of public safety. In order to obtain the
optimal level of criminality and taxes, ½¤(¿ ) can be inserted in either (5) or (6).
Solving the ensuing equation yields ¿ ¤ as well as ½¤ = ½¤(¿¤).
We now want to use this framework to reformulate the observations made in the
introduction. First, there is no reason to expect the expansion path in (8) to be
very di¤erent between Europe and the US. Our reasoning being that relative prices,
police productivity, crime technology etc. should not be very di¤erent across these
two continents. The only remaining candidates for an explanation are the functions
b and c: Suppose, for example, that the marginal damage of crime c0 is exogenously
raised. Criminality would go down and the optimal policy mix would adjust along
the expansion path. In order to derive the exact adjustment, we use the implicit
function theorem to calculate the slope of ½¤(¿ ):
d½¤
d¿
= ¡
e½n¿¿ ¡ n½ e¿¿
n¿ e½½ ¡ e¿ n½½
> 0: (9)
Given that this slope is positive, we conclude that the reduction in criminality is
obtained by using more of both instruments, nanced via higher taxes.
This consequence means, however, that the above line of reasoning cannot explain
the transatlantic di¤erences, since it leads to a counterfactual result otherwise. Even
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though appealing to a greater risk aversion on the part of European taxpayers would
explain lower crime rates, higher transfers and higher taxes, it yields a contradiction in
the case of police expenditures. The foregoing argument would suggest that European
law enforcement should be higher than in the US, contrary to empirical facts. A
natural question raised by this shortcoming is whether the model can be enriched to
overcome this counterfactual conclusion? Our explanation will rely on transfers not
being solely determined for security reasons.
4. Transfers based on altruism
Even though it is generally conceded that transfers reduce incentives for crimes, most
economists and the public at large would maintain that equity considerations are the
main driving force behind income maintenance programs. Taking this into account,
we examine how the optimal law enforcement policy varies when we exogenously
introduce a minimum level of welfare for the poor.
Specically, we solve the following optimization problem:
max
½;¿
va = a¡ b(e(½; ¿))¡ c(n(½; ¿ )) (II)
subject to v0 = ¿ > v0 : (10)
Here, v0 is the predetermined level of utility for the poor. The resulting optimality
conditions are the same as in the foregoing section except for the complementary
slackness requirement. The ensuing solution (½¤¤; ¿¤¤) of (II) is characterized by the
conditions (5), (6) and
¹(¿ ¤¤ ¡ v0) = 0: (11)
Again, there are two possibilities, depending on whether the wealth constraint for the
poor is binding or not. From the foregoing section, we conclude that for v0 · ¿
¤ the
constraint will not be binding. Analytically, we are in the case where the solutions
of (I) and (II) coincide and transfers are solely determined on the basis of security
considerations.
In the other case the wealth constraint for the disfavored is binding, requiring
v0 = ¿
¤¤ > ¿¤: Here, transfers are dictated entirely by altruism. Nevertheless, the
redistributive payments still inuence criminality. Consequently, transfers to the
disfavored must be taken into account when deriving the optimal law enforcement
policy. The ensuing relationship ½ = ½¤¤(¿ ) is dened by (5). In the remaining, we
focus solely on this case.
Paralleling the procedure of the foregoing section, suppose we consider an exoge-
nous change, which triggers higher transfers. Given the current structure, this can
only occur through an increase in v0. Applying the implicit function theorem, yields
d½¤¤
d¿
= ¡
b00e½ e¿ + c00n½n¿
b00e2
½
+ b0e½½ + c00n2½ + c
0n½½
< 0 : (12)
In contrast to the foregoing situation, where income maintenance was based on
security reasons alone, the current trade-o¤ founded on altruism features a negative
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correlation between police and redistributive expenditures. This suggests that het-
erogeneous attitudes towards the welfare state can provide a plausible explanation for
the di¤erence in law enforcement policies on both sides of the Atlantic. According to
this line of reasoning, it would be the high level of redistribution in Western Europe
which crowds out police expenditures.
To complete the argument, we now show that our model also explains the second
stylized fact discussed in the introduction. Specically, we prove that if transfers are
raised above ¿¤, then not only are police expenditures reduced, but security is also
raised.
At ¿ ¤ the level of criminality is dened by n(½¤¤(¿ ¤); ¿¤). To prove the claim, we
need to show that
dn
d¿
(½¤¤(¿ ¤); ¿ ¤) = n½
d½¤¤
d¿
+ n¿ < 0 : (13)
Since by construction (½¤; ¿¤) = (½¤¤(¿ ¤); ¿ ¤), The above inequality is equivalent to:
n¿
n½
> ¡
d½¤¤
d¿
=
b00e½ e¿ + c00n½n¿
b00e2
½
+ b0e½½ + c00n2½ + c
0n½½
: (14)
Using (8), to rewrite the inequality yields
1 >
b00e2
½
+ c00n2
½
b00e2
½
+ b0e½½ + c00n2½ + c
0n½½
; (15)
which is obviously true, since b0e½½ + c
0n½½ > 0.
The result can be represented geometrically. In gure 1, we have drawn the opti-
mal solution (¿ ¤; ½¤) from the case where transfers are justied alone on the grounds
of lowering criminality. The resulting level of security is shown by the associated
isocriminality curve n¤ = n(½; ¿ ). It is easy to derive from the initial assumptions
that all the isocriminality curves are decreasing and convex, and that a shift to a
higher curve implies a reduction in crimes.
As long as ¿¤ ¸ v0; the solutions to both problems coincide. However, to the
right of ¿ ¤, income maintenance to the poor is determined exogenously and justied
on the basis of altruism. In that case ½¤¤ is dened by ½¤¤(¿ ). From (12) we know
that this function slopes downwards. Furthermore, we see from the inequality (14)
that the isocriminality curve is steeper than ½¤¤(¿). Consequently, moving locally to
the right of ¿ ¤ along ½¤¤(¿ ) leads to a higher isocriminality curve, which also denotes
more security.
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Law enforcement versus transfers
For completeness, we note that the foregoing logic cannot be more than a local
argument. Indeed, as the exogenously given level of transfer to the poor increases, it
must, at some point, totally crowd out law enforcement expenditures due the budget
constraint of the government. The argument being that public revenue is necessarily
restricted by the La¤er curve e¤ect. Of course, at that point, despite a high level
of income maintenance, criminality should be on the raise again! Indeed, transfers
can only be e¤ective to ght illegal behavior if there is a possibility to be deprived of
them when an agent undertakes a crime. Hence, one must always rely on some level
of law enforcement for transfers to have any impact.
5. Concluding remarks
The di¤erent pattern for criminal behavior, across otherwise fairly conform societies
as Europe and the US, is a challenge to understand. In the current analysis, we have
emphasized the potential role played by redistribution as a possible explanatory vari-
able. A conclusive analysis would require much more. Not only would it necessitate
some empirical work, but also the integration of alternative explanatory variables,
in particular, the diverging legislation on arms and drugs. Nevertheless, the note
suggests that part of the explanation might be due to di¤ering attitudes across both
continents towards redistributive taxation.
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